Financial Development and Income in Developing Countries by Mina Baliamoune-Lutz











FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND INCOME  






































This paper presents an empirical analysis of the controversial relationship between financial 
system development and economic development. Using cointegration and VAR estimations 
on annual data from Africa, we examine the nature of the relationship between financial 
development and income. We find mixed results on both the short and the long-run 
relationships between the two variables. We find finance causing income, income causing 
finance, and bi-directional causality. The results indicate that neither the short-run effects nor 
the long-run relationship seem to linearly depend on the level of financial development or the 
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1.  Introduction 
A large number of studies have emphasized the important role of the financial sector in 
economic growth, including some early work (for example, Bagehot, 1873 and Schumpeter, 
1911; and later on the work of Gurley and Shaw, 1955; Goldsmith, 1969; Mckinnon, 1973; 
and Shaw, 1973) and more recent work such as Levine (1997), Beck et al. (2000), Benhabib 
and Spiegel (2000), and Levine et al. (2000). Yet, a good number of scholars have maintained 
that finance may not be a significant determinant of economic growth and development and 
may in fact be caused by development or growth (Robinson, 1952; Lucas, 1988; Stern 1989).   
Patrick (1966) referred to the causality from financial development to economic 
growth and the causality from growth to financial development as the supply-leading 
hypothesis and demand-following hypothesis, respectively. Many studies have tried to test 
the validity of these hypotheses. In the early literature, the supply-leading hypothesis finds 
support in the work of, for example, Schumpeter (1912) and McKinnon (1973); while the 
demand-following proposition seems to have support in Robinson (1952), Goldsmith (1969), 
and Lucas (1988). It is important to note that some scholars have shown that there may be bi-
directional causality between economic growth and financial development (Lewis, 1955; 
Gupta, 1984; Jung, 1986).   
More recent empirical literature reports conflicting findings.  For example, King and 
Levine (1993a) argue that “finance seems importantly to lead economic growth.” The authors 
show that the level of financial development is a predictor of productivity improvement and 
economic development. On the other hand, Demetriades and Hussein (1996) find little 
empirical evidence that finance causes growth, while Luintel and Khan (1999), and Calderón 
and Liu (2003) show that there is bi-directional causality between growth and financial 
development. Moreover, some studies argue that financial development may have a negative 
influence on growth. Improved financial development that leads to better resource allocation 
increases returns and may lower saving (income effect) and thus may cause growth to fall 
(Bencivenga and Smith, 1991; King and Levine, 1993b; Baliamoune and Chowdhury, 2003).   
This paper addresses an important empirical question in the context of a set of 18 sub-
Saharan African (SSA) economies. More specifically, we estimate bivariate vector 
autoregressive (VAR) equations and perform Granger-causality tests to explore the nature of 
the relationship between economic development (income per capita) and financial 
development (banking sector development), using two indicators of financial development.  
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We perform bivariate (instead of multivariate) VAR estimations primarily  to be consistent 
with the Demetriades and Hussein’s study, to which we compare our results. The goal of the 
present study is not the study of the determinants of income. Rather, we explore whether 
there exists a long-run stable relationship between two time series (financial development and 
income), and we examine Granger causality (whether financial development Granger causes 
income or vice versa) between them. Granger causality tests provide evidence on  weak 
exogeniety, which is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for strong exogeneity. 
Our interest in African countries is motivated mainly by the following considerations. 
First, some recent empirical studies have found that the relationship between financial 
development and growth (or income) in African countries (using panel data) is negative or 
non-existent (see, for example, Baliamoune-Lutz and Ndikumana, 2007). Second, some 
African countries have somewhat liberalized the financial sector, while others still maintain 
financial repression. It would thus be useful to examine the differences in the finance-income 
nexus in countries at different levels of financial liberalization. Third, the institutional 
environment that is relevant to a good functioning of the financial system is at various levels 
of quality; with South Africa, Gabon and Mauritius having a strong institutional environment, 
while the remaining countries are between very weak to somewhat good institutional 
environment. Given these considerations, a significant contribution of this paper is to shed 
additional light on the finance-growth relationship by focusing on a sample of African 
countries that offer a broader range of stages of financial development as well as a broader 
range (in terms of quality) of financial-system supporting institutions. 
We begin our investigation by conducting Phillips-Perron unit root-tests to determine 
whether the variables are stationary (in levels). Second, for non-stationary variables we test 
for the presence of cointegration (using Johansen’s cointegration  rank test) between our 
measure of financial development and income. Cointegration tests allow us to explore 
whether there is a long-run stable relationship between economic and financial development. 
Third, we perform Zivot-Andrews tests to examine the presence of unit root with unknown 
structural break, and the Gregory-Hansen cointegration test which is a more appropriate test 
when there is structural change in the data. Indeed, in contrast to the results based on the 
Johansen’s cointegration test, the Gregory-Hansen test results suggest that there is no 
cointegration between income and financial development in any of the 18 countries. Finally, 
we estimate VAR models and test for the direction of causality between financial 
development and growth and we make inferences on short-run and long-run effects based on 
the impulse response functions associated with the VAR equations. We obtain three  
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important findings. First, the time series properties of per-capita real GDP and the indicators 
of financial development differ across countries and across financial development indicators. 
Second, the short-run relationship may differ from the long-run relationship between 
financial development and income. Third, neither the long-run nor the short-run effects seem 
to linearly depend on the level of economic or financial development. However, we find no 
evidence of a short or long-run effect from financial development to income in most countries 
in the middle range of financial development (and institutional quality). The  policy 
implications of this finding are important, as many developing countries have undertaken 
partial institutional and financial sector reforms. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we review the 
literature with emphasis on the empirical studies on the direction of causality between 
economic growth and financial development. Section 3 provides a description of the data and 
methodology. Section 4 reports and discusses the empirical results. Concluding remarks are 
included in section 5. 
 
2.  Literature review 
It has been widely argued in the literature
1 that the main effects of financial development on 
growth (or economic development) operate through enhancing the functions of the financial 
system, including enhancing risk a melioration, improving the allocation of resources, 
allowing a better access to information about investments, improving monitoring and 
increasing saving mobilization (See Levine, 1997). Another important source of effects stems 
from the interaction between technology diversification and financial markets. Saint-Paul 
(1992) emphasizes the effects of financial markets on technological choice. Using a 
theoretical model, he shows that underdeveloped financial markets can lead to agents 
investing in less specialized industries. In turn, technological choices have an impact on 
financial markets. Saint-Paul shows that this interaction can result in multiple equilibria; a 
low equilibrium with underdeveloped financial markets and unspecialized technology and a 
high equilibrium with specialized technology and extensive division of labor.  
Recent empirical literature on the relationship between financial development and 
growth includes Bencivenga and Smith (1991), King and Levine (1993a and 1993b), 
Demetriades and Hussein (1996), Luintel and Khan (1999), Beck et al. (2000), Xu (2000), 
Calderón and Liu (2003) and Ang and McKibbin (2007). Interestingly, this literature contains 
findings that point to the possibility of several types of relationships. Depending on the  
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econometric model, data frequency and the country or region studied, finance is causing 
growth, growth is causing finance, there is bi-directional causality, and there is no causality. 
The link between finance and growth may also depend on the level of the country’s economic 
development or the level of financial sector development (Rioja and Valev, 2004). For 
example, King and Levine (1993a) argue that finance causes economic growth. On the other 
hand, Demetriades and Hussein (1996) find little empirical evidence in support of the supply-
leading proposition (the hypothesis that finance causes growth). Ang and McKibbin (2007) 
use Malaysian time series data from 1960 to 2001 and perform cointegration and causality 
tests of the finance-growth link. They find that “ removing the repressionist policies has a 
favorable effect in stimulating financial sector development”. The authors find a positive 
relationship between financial depth and economic development but the evidence they derive 
shows that it is output growth that leads to financial depth in the long-run. Calderón and Liu 
(2003) use data for 109 developing and industrial countries from 1960 to 1994 and report that 
there is bi-directional causality between financial development and growth. They also show 
that financial deepening contributes more to the causality link between growth and financial 
development in developing countries than in industrial countries. Other studies, including 
Demetriades and Hussein (1996), and Gregorio and Guidotti (1995) have derived mixed 
results. In addition, there is theoretical and empirical evidence that the relationship between 
financial development and growth (or development) can be nonlinear. For example, Allen 
and Gale (1997) develop a theoretical model that accounts for the presence of financial 
intermediaries and financial markets in an economy and show that “economies that are 
intermediary-based may be worse off by allowing access to financial markets.” Deidda and 
Fattouh (2008) derive a similar conclusion in their theoretical model and obtain empirical 
evidence (based on cross-sectional analysis covering more that 100 countries) suggesting 
nonlinearity in the finance–growth relationship. The authors find that while both bank and 
stock market development have a positive impact  on growth, the growth effect of bank 
development is weaker the higher the level of stock market development.  
Finally, some scholars have emphasized the importance of considering the stages of 
development (Patrick, 1966; Calderón and Liu, 2003; Osborne, 2006). It seems that the 
direction of causality between finance and growth may invert itself as development proceeds; 
finance causes growth at low levels of development, and growth causes financial 
development at high levels of economic development. The stage-of-development proposition 
(Patrick, 1966) implies that the supply-leading hypothesis holds in the early stages of 
development and the demand-following hypothesis tends to hold in later stages of  
 
 
6   
development. In the early stages of development, the creation of new financial services 
enhances intermediation, saving, and investment which leads to higher growth (supply-
leading proposition). At higher levels of financial and economic development, economic 
growth creates need for new financial services and so the demand-following proposition 
tends to prevail. 
Perhaps with the exception of Gupta (1984) and Jung (1986), focus on the direction of 
causality between financial development and growth is quite recent and began only since the 
mid-1990s (Demetriades and Hussein, 1996; Luintel and Khan, 1999; Levine et al., 2000; 
Baliamoune-Lutz, 2003; Calderón and Liu, 2003). It is important to note that Gupta (1984) 
and Jung (1986) both ignore the long-run properties (unit-root and cointegration) of the time 
series used. In addition, Gupta uses only the level of broad money as a measure of financial 
development. In fact, many studies use the ratio of broad money to GDP (M2) as indicator of 
financial development. However, as pointed out by Demetriades and Hussein (1996), since 
the ratio of M2 to GDP is the inverse of M2 velocity, the positive relationship between real 
GDP and financial development may reflect the effect of GDP on the velocity of circulation. 
This would occur if the income elasticity of money demand exceeds unity. In this case, 
causality will be from economic development to financial development.  
Luintel and Khan (1999) estimate cointegration and vector-error correction (VEC) 
models and find bi-directional causality between financial development—proxied by the ratio 
of total deposit liabilities of deposit banks to nominal GDP—and economic growth using a 
sample of ten countries. This measure, however, has been criticized by Demetriades and 
Hussein (1996) who justly argue that a rise in this indicator may reflect the increase in 
savings and not necessarily a rise in the supply of credit to the private sector. The latter is 
more in line with the McKinnon-Shaw proposition that the supply of credit to the private 
sector is crucial to the quantity and quality of investment (Demetriades and Hussein, 1996). 
In their influential empirical study, Demetriades and Hussein (1996) employ 
cointegration and VEC techniques and two measures of financial development; the ratio of 
total deposit liabilities to nominal GDP and the ratio of bank claims on the private sector to 
nominal GDP. The authors focus on a sample of 16 developing countries and report that they 
could not find evidence that financial development unequivocally promotes growth. On the 
other hand, their results indicate that growth causes financial development.
2 
It is worth noting that seven of the countries included in Demetriades and Hussein 
(1996) were also included in Luintel and Khan (1999) but the findings in the two studies were 
quite different.  When the measure of financial development is the ratio of total deposit  
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liabilities of deposit banks to nominal GDP, Demetriades and Hussein find that growth and 
financial development are cointegrated in India, Greece, Costa Rica, Korea, South Africa, 
and Thailand. They find no cointegration between the two variables in Sri-Lanka.  Luintel 
and Khan find evidence of cointegration in all seven countries. Furthermore, while Luintel 
and Khan find bi-directional Granger causality between financial development and economic 
growth in all these countries (based on multivariate VAR), Demetriades and Hussein use a 
bivariate VAR and show that there is no causality between the two variables in Sri Lanka and 
South Africa, and reverse causality (from income to financial development) in Costa Rica and 
Greece. The only countries where they find bi-directional causality are India, Korea, and 
Thailand. Thus, in spite of using the same measure of financial development, the two studies 
obtain significantly different results for Sri Lanka, South Africa, Greece, and Costa Rica. 
This clearly indicates that the issue of cointegration and the direction of causality question 
remain unsettled and warrant more empirical studies. 
 
3.  Empirical estimation 
3.1   Data and methodology 
We use annual data from 18 African countries, namely Botswana, Côte d’Ivoire, Cameroon, 
Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, the Gambia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Niger, 
Nigeria, Senegal, Swaziland, Togo, South Africa, and Zimbabwe. The data are for the period 
1960-2001 (some countries are missing data for some years at the beginning of the period). 
We use two indicators of financial development:
3 the ratio of liquid liabilities (currency plus 
demand and interest-bearing liabilities of banks and nonbank financial intermediaries) to 
GDP, a measure of the size of financial intermediaries (labeled LIQ); and the ratio of private 
credit by deposit money banks and other financial institutions to GDP (labeled PRIVCR). In 
general, the extent of financial deepening may be best measured by the ratio of liquid 
liabilities of financial institutions to GDP (see Benhabib and Spiegel, 2000). However, some 
studies (see for example, Demetriades and Hussein, 1996) have stressed that credit to the 
private sector may be a better proxy for financial development. The use of credit to the 
private sector is based on the assumption, as noted by Levine (2005), that “financial systems 
that allocate more credit to private firms are more engaged in researching firms, exerting 
corporate control, providing risk management services, mobilizing savings, and facilitating 
transactions than financial systems that simply funnel credit to the government or state owned  
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enterprises.” Data on financial development indicators used in the present study are from the 
World Bank Financial Structure Database.  
It is important to note that bank-based measures of financial development are more 
appropriate when analyzing data from developing countries because their stock markets tend 
to have low activity and the bulk of private saving and borrowing (in the formal market) takes 
place in the banking sector. Thus, as argued in Baliamoune-Lutz (2003), financial 
development in developing countries tends to center on the development of money and 
financial intermediation not the development of capital markets which is more prevalent in 
developed countries.  
Following some influential work in this area (such as King and Levine, 1993a,b; 
Demetriades and Hussein, 1996; Luintel and Khan, 1999), our measure of economic 
development is real per-capita gross domestic product (GDP) in natural logarithm. However, 
we specifically follow Demetriades and Hussein (1996) and measure real GDP in domestic 
currency (not US dollars). As pointed out by Demetriades and Hussein, this would minimize 
the problems associated with exchange rate conversions. The source of data on real GDP is 
the World Development Indicators Database (World Bank, 2003). 
Since the data are time series, we need to explore their long-run properties by 
performing unit-root and cointegration tests. First, we use the Phillips-Perron unit-root test 
(Phillips and Perron 1988) to test the stationarity of each variable. The Phillips-Perron (PP) 
test tends to be more reliable than the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test if the presence of 
structural breaks is suspected. The results of unit-root tests are summarized in Table 1.  
Second, to explore the nature of the long-run relationship between financial development and 
economic development, we perform Johansen’s cointegration tests for those variables that are 
integrated of order 1 [I(1)] and report the results in Table 2. This type of analysis is in general 
straightforward and includes (1) testing for unit root; (2) if both series are I(1) then we 
proceed to cointegration; (3) if no cointegration (or if the degree of integration is mixed—I(0) 
and I(1))—we run the standard Granger causality test by using variables in first differences to 
test for causality; and (4) if the variables are cointegrated, we estimate VEC models in order 
to explore the long-run relationship and short-run dynamics.
4 The results in Table 1 indicate 
that all the variables have unit root and are difference-stationary or I(1) except for the 
variable LIQ in Ghana. Johansen’s cointegration test results (Table 2) indicate that all 
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However, Phillips-Perron test assumes a known structural break. If the break point is 
determined endogenously (unknown), as is the case here, then we need to use the more 
refined test provided by Zivot and Andrews (1992). The results from the Zivot-Andrews test 
of unit root with unknown structural break are reported in Table 3. The Zivot-Andrews test 
statistic values indicate that, once we account for a shift in the intercept, a change in the slope 
of the trend function, or a change in both six countries (Ethiopia, Niger, Senegal, Swaziland, 
Togo, and Zimbabwe) have at least one variable that is stationary in level or I (0). Variables 
in all other countries remain nonstationary in their levels.  
Furthermore, since the time period covered in the analysis is forty years and most of 
the countries included introduced reform measures at different periods of time, the Gregory-
Hansen cointegration test with structural change (Gregory and Hansen, 1996) is more 
appropriate. The Gregory-Hansen test results reported in Table 4 indicate that the hypothesis 
of no cointegration cannot be rejected in any of the 12 countries (where all the variables have 
unit root) regardless of the financial development indicator used.  
                          
3.2    Estimation results 
Taking into account the results from Zivot-Andrews and Gregory-Hansen tests (accounting 
for structural breaks), we perform Granger causality tests (tests of  weak exogeniety) and 
estimate bi-variate VAR equations. We also generate impulse response functions (see Figure 
1). The results shown in Table 5 suggest that the evidence on causality is quite mixed. When 
financial development is measured by the ratio of liquid liabilities  to GDP (LIQ), the 
statistical evidence indicates that income causes financial development (at the 5-percent level 
of significance or better) in seven countries: Gabon, the Gambia, Mauritius, Nigeria, Senegal, 
Swaziland and Togo. On the other hand, finance seems to cause income only in three 
countries (Botswana, Côte d’Ivoire and Niger), while there is evidence of bi-directional 
causality in two countries (South Africa and Zimbabwe). When financial development is 
measured by the ratio of private credit by  deposit money banks and other financial 
institutions to GDP (PRIVCR), the statistical evidence suggests that income causes financial 
development in six cases (The Gambia, Kenya, Madagascar, Niger, Senegal, and Togo), 
while finance causes income in two countries only, Botswana and Mauritius. On the other 
hand, the results suggest that there is bi-directional causality in Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, 
Nigeria, South Africa and Zimbabwe. Thus, South Africa and Zimbabwe seem to have bi-
directional causality in the c ase of both financial development indicators, The Gambia,  
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Senegal and Togo have unidirectional causality from income for both financial development 
indicators, whereas only Botswana shows unidirectional causality from finance to income for 
both indicators. 
However, liquid liabilities measure the ability of banks to mobilize funds or the size 
of the banking system relative to the economy, as well as the extent of monetization rather 
than the extent of financial development. Demetriades and Hussein (1996) and Luintel and 
Khan (1999), among others, have argued that monetization can be increasing without 
financial development occurring in developing economies. In addition, in the literature, the 
private sector credit is probably the most relevant measure of financial development. Thus, 
we will focus more on PRIVC results to make inference and conclusions. 
Bivariate VAR estimates provide support for the supply-leading hypothesis in only 
two countries (Botswana and Mauritius), while there is support for the demand-following 
hypothesis (income causes financial development) in six countries. On the other hand five 
countries have bi-directional causality, while there is no Granger causality between the two 
variables in either direction in five countries (Cameroon, Gabon, Ghana, Malawi and 
Swaziland). 
In order to make inference on the effects of financial development on income (and 
income on financial development), we use impulse-response functions based the VAR 
specifications associated with the results reported in Table 5 (the 13 countries that show 
evidence of Granger-causality in at least one direction). The impulse response functions in 
Figure 1 indicate that the effects vary from country to country and there are significant 
differences between the short-run (1-3 years) and long-run (4-10 years) effects. 
 
4.  Discussion of the findings and policy implications 
This study is in the spirit of the work by Demetriades and Hussein (1996) in that we use a 
bivariate VAR and include the same measures of financial development that the authors use, 
namely  the variables LIQ and PRIVCR. Our results are similar to the ones derived in 
Demetriades and Hussein (1996) in that we find causality from financial development to 
income, bi-directional causality, and reverse causality. However, our findings for South 
Africa differ from theirs in that we show that there is bi-directional causality between income 
and financial development in the case of both indicators of financial development, while 
Demetriades and Hussein find uni-directional causality from income to financial 
development. This difference may be due primarily to the fact that we use a longer time  
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period and a more appropriate lag length, and we also account for structural breaks. We show 
that causality between financial development and economic development may differ even 
across countries with comparable levels of development and located within the same region. 
This is an important finding that casts doubt on the validity of the stage-of-development 
hypothesis formulated in Patrick (1966) and empirically validated in Calderón and Liu, 2003. 
The 18 countries in our sample have all been included (along with countries from other 
regions) in the study by Calderón and Liu (2003). Except for Mauritius, all these countries 
were included in their low-and middle-income group of countries. They find that financial 
development (financial depth and the ratio of credit to the private sector to GDP) has an 
impact on growth and that there is bi-directional (Granger) causality between the two 
variables. Another important finding in their study is that financial deepening has a stronger 
impact on growth in developing countries. This result is consistent with the proposition 
arguing that the direction of causality between financial development and income (or growth) 
may depend on the stages of development (Patrick 1966). However, the present study does 
not find any evidence to support this proposition. 
Clearly, the results we derive are mixed. Nonetheless, it may be more useful to 
analyze them while taking into account the different aspects of the institutional environment 
and financial systems in individual countries. To do so, we refer to the study by Gelbard and 
Leite (1999) and use the indexes they developed (see Table 6). The index of financial 
development (and the indicators used to generate it) is for 1997. However, given that 
financial development and institutional factors generally work with significant lags and 
change only slowly, we believe using these indices is appropriate. 
Table 6 summarizes the values of the financial development index and sub-indices 
from Gelbard and Leite (1999). Financial systems in two countries, South Africa and 
Mauritius (with an index equal to 91 and 84, respectively), can be considered developed.  
However, we obtain different empirical evidence on both the long-run and the short-run 
relationships between financial development (PRIVCR) and income. In South Africa we find 
bi-directional causality, while in Mauritius we find unidirectional causality from PRIVCR to 
income. Furthermore, the evidence (impulse response function) points to a negative impact of 
PRIVCR on income both in the short-run and the long run. On the other hand, there is a 
positive long-run effect of financial development on income in Mauritius. 
It is interesting to note that we obtain mixed results for countries with developed 
financial systems (South Africa and Mauritius) and for countries with significantly 
underdeveloped financial systems (with an index lower than 50), such as Ethiopia, Malawi,  
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and Togo. In Ethiopia, we find bi-directional causality with a positive short-run impact and 
an ambiguous long-run effect from income to PRIVCR, while as there is a negative short-run 
effect from financial development to income and a long-run effect that is negative for the first 
few years and turns positive in the sixth year, suggesting that the positive effect of financial 
development has a significant lag. On the other hand, in Malawi we did not find evidence of 
Granger causality in either direction, whereas in Togo income causes financial development 
with a negative immediate effect but a significant positive long-run impact. Similarly, we 
find mixed evidence for the countries that have a somewhat developed financial sector and 
above average values for the index of monetary policy instruments, such as Botswana, 
Gabon, Ghana and Kenya. In Botswana the short-run impact of financial development is 
positive in the short run but mostly negative in the long run. In Gabon and Ghana there is no 
evidence of causality between financial development and income. On the other hand, in 
Kenya, income has a positive effect on financial development both in the short and long run, 
providing support for the demand-following hypothesis.  
A recent but growing body of empirical literature focuses on the effects of 
institutional quality and legal origin (Levine et al., 2000; Andrianova et al., 2008; Chinn and 
Ito, 2006; Demetriades and Law, 2006) on the effectiveness of financial development. Using 
a panel of 108 countries over the period 1980-2000, Chinn and Ito (2006) find that financial 
openness fosters equity market development conditional on a threshold level of legal 
development. The authors also find that trade openness is a prerequisite of the liberalization 
of capital accounts whereas the development of the banking sector is a prerequisite for the 
development of equity markets. In addition to their direct effects on financial development, 
institutional factors, such as deposit contract enforcement, could influence the ownership 
structure of the banking sector. Andrianova et al. (2008) find that institutions could be more 
important in explaining the share of state banks than political or historical factors.  
Demetriades and Law (2006) perform OLS and panel estimations on data from 72 
countries covering the period 1978-2000 and find that institutional quality has an important 
role in enhancing the positive effects of financial development on per capita income. In 
addition, the authors show that the impact of financial development is strongest in middle-
income countries. The results outlined in Demetriades and Law (2006) also indicate that in 
low-income countries, in the absence of sound institutions, higher financial development may 
not have any effect on long-term development (income level). The sample in Demetriades 
and Law includes ten of the countries that are also in our sample: Cameroon, Gambia, Ghana, 
Kenya, Malawi, Niger, Senegal, Togo, Zimbabwe, and South Africa. They include South  
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Africa in the middle-income group and the other nine countries in the low-income group. 
However, our results show that in South Africa the long-run effect of financial development 
(PRIVCR) and income is negative and statistically significant, while in Zimbabwe there is a 
positive short-run impact and an ambiguous long-run effect. On the other, there is no 
evidence of causality from financial development in the other countries. 
Finally, It is important to note that the institutional environment should affect both 
financial development and growth (and their interplay) more in the long run than in the short 
run, mainly because institutions are considered deep determinants of growth and development 
(Acemoglu et al., 2001). Table 7 shows the institutional indicator (relevant to financial 
development) and the summarized results on the short and long-term effects of financial 
development on income. We note that in countries with very good institutional environment  
(90-100)—South Africa, Gabon, and Mauritius—and in countries with poor institutions 
(index lower than 50) the results are mixed. However, in countries in the middle range (50-
90), and with the exception of Botswana, the statistical evidence indicates that financial 
development does not affect income.  
There are at least two important policy implications of the empirical results. First, 
countries undertaking institutional and policy reform—as do many of the countries in sub-
Saharan Africa—should create and enforce sound regulation of the banking system. The 
results suggest that in countries that have undertaken partial institutional and policy reform, 
financial development may not be income enhancing. This result seems consistent with the 
arguments in Stiglitz (2000) on the importance of sound regulation of the banking system. 
The liberalization of the financial sector without good regulatory institutions may produce 
adverse effects that could negate the positive effects of financial development on income. 
 Second, the results obtained in this paper imply, as also noted by Ang (2010) in the 
case of India, that for financial development to enhance income and growth policymakers 
should aim at broadening financial inclusion and improving access to finance for the poor. In 
addition, policy reforms such as those aimed at increasing trade openness or financial 
liberalization may have adverse effects on the effectiveness of financial development. For 
example, Ang (2008b) finds that greater trade openness seems to have negative effects on the 
financial system in Malaysia. One channel through which partial reforms may affect the 
interplay between income and financial development is income distribution. Often, short-term 
winners tend to prevent the reform efforts from moving forward while at the same time 
preferring not to go back to a no-reform economy. This situation would be more plausible in 
countries with high income inequality and/or a very small middle-class group. While many  
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studies have maintained that financial development reduces income inequality
5 (see for 
example, Galor and Zeira, 1993; Banerjee and Newman, 1993; Clarke et al., 2006) it is very 
likely that a persistent state of partial reforms could actually exacerbate inequality, 
particularly if the middle class—which would normally gain better access to credit in the 
presence of financial reform, since the poor in many developing countries tend to use the 
informal sector and hence may not be significantly affected by the reform, especially in the 
early stages—is small. This would be consistent with the predictions of the theoretical model 
in Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990), where the process of development includes a range 
(transition) within which income inequality increases with initial increases in financial 
development. Interestingly, Ang (2010) finds that while financial development helps reduce 
income inequality in India, financial liberalization seems to exacerbate it.   
 
5.  Concluding remarks 
This paper examines causality between income and two indicators of financial development 
using time series data from 18 SSA countries. VAR estimates show that the evidence on the 
link between financial development and income is quite mixed. Impulse response functions 
suggest that the evidence on the nature of the short and long-run effects is also mixed but 
most of the countries show a negative effect. Only in Mauritius do we find a positive long-
run impact of financial development (credit to the private sector) on income.  
In general, the empirical results are consistent with the findings in Demetriades and 
Hussein (1996). Similar to their results, we fail to find strong evidence that finance leads 
economic development and we find evidence of bi-directional causality and reverse 
causation. An important implication of these findings is that given the mixed results and the 
disparities among countries, cross-sectional models do not seem to be suitable for the study 
of the relationship between financial and economic development. The present study is, 
however, different from Demetriades and Hussein (1996) in an important way; it includes a 
sample of countries at fairly comparable levels of development (in the wider sense) for most 
of the time period under examination. This allows us to test the validity of the dependence of 
the relationship between financial development and income on the stage of development. 
Demetriades and Hussein (1996) include countries at different stages of development (for 
example, Spain versus India or Pakistan). A major finding in this paper is the negative long-
run relationship between financial development and income in countries within what we call 
the ‘range of partial reform.’ We outline the policy implications of this finding in section 4.  
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Our results also highlight the need to explore additional channels through which 
financial development could affect economic development, such as income inequality, the 
quality (and extent) of institutional and policy reforms, as well as the choice of optimal 
policy. For example, Berthelemy and Varoukadis (1996) show that in the presence of 
underdeveloped financial markets, openness to trade may be ineffective while government 
expenditure has a positive impact on growth. Similarly, Njuguna and Ngugi (1999) report 
that liberalization of the financial system and exchange rate market in Kenya in the 1990s 
created a policy dilemma and complicated macroeconomic management. This is because the 
inflation profile changed with exchange rate policy, so Kenya was unable to target low 
inflation with interest rate as the sole instrument. 
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Adj. t-Stat 




difference  Level 
First 
difference  Level 
First 
difference 
Botswana  -1.290  -3.163**  -2.399  -4.500***  -2.081  -3.379*** 
Côte d’Ivoire  -1.986  -5.253***  -2.830  -5.262***  -0.670  -4.314*** 
Cameroon  -1.371  -4.554***  -1.998  -7.232***  -1.028  -6.254*** 
Ethiopia  -1.926  -4.039***  -2.355  -6.013***  -1.975  -3.165*** 
Gabon  -2.539  -4.449***  -2.573  -4.819***  -2.092  -5.004*** 
Ghana  -1.369  -4.696***  -3.445**  --  -0.734  -5.480*** 
The Gambia  -1.864  -5.697***  -3.491  -7.690***  -1.701  -5.471*** 
Kenya  -1.837  -6.411***  -2.213  -4.421***  -1.675  -4.174*** 
Madagascar  -0.655  -4.853***  -2.764  -7.458***  -1.639  -4.501*** 
Malawi  -2.187  -6.904***  -2.804  -5.131***  -1.776  -2.894*** 
Mauritius  -0.249  -3.255**  -1.902  -7.055***   1.182  -4.784*** 
Niger   -3.193  -5.494***  -0.727  -3.598***  -1.026  -3.969*** 
Nigeria  -2.078  -4.519***  -1.624  -5.545***  -1.518  -5.1347 
Senegal  -2.234  -8.002***  -2.182  -4.111***  -1.506  -3.254*** 
Swaziland  -2.542  -7.014***  -3.468  -3.363***  -2.323  -3.654*** 
Togo  -2.635  -6.209***  -1.713  -5.907***  -2.127  -5.783*** 
South Africa  -2.917  -4.485***  -1.340  -4.394***   1.807  -2.976*** 
Zimbabwe  -2.158  -4.279***  -2.195  -3.744***  -1.820  -5.200*** 
 
 
The critical values differ according to the number of observations and lags included. More 
details may be obtained from the author. 
Notes: ** and *** denote 5% and 1% level of significance, respectively.  
 






Table 2. Cointegration test results – Trace statistic (cont.) 
Hypothesized No. of CE(s) 
None   At most 1 
LIQ 
 
Trace Statistic  0.05 Critical Value  Trace Statistic  0.05 Critical Value 
Botswana   21.19301   20.26184   8.984289   9.164546 
Cameroon   27.59812   20.26184   7.923728   9.164546 
Côte d’Ivoire   77.43891   20.26184   22.63250   9.164546 
Ethiopia   12.80418   12.32090   0.835086   4.129906 
Gabon   50.97812   18.39771   0.297880   3.841466 
Ghana  --  --  --  -- 
The Gambia   67.42555   25.87211   12.44630   12.51798 
Kenya   55.07071   20.26184   4.735996   9.164546 
Madagascar   31.13488   25.87211   8.188349   12.51798 
Malawi   23.95102   20.26184   5.982518   9.164546 
Mauritius   26.25805   25.87211   8.809636   12.51798 
Niger    34.36617   25.87211   4.996160   12.51798 
Nigeria   36.57696   20.26184   6.788654   9.164546 
Senegal   45.86224   25.87211   10.41098   12.51798 
Swaziland   99.25836   18.39771   0.000764   3.841466 
Togo   29.14217   20.26184   9.569280   9.164546 
South Africa   41.12221   25.87211   9.711776   12.51798 
Zimbabwe   29.23385   25.87211   7.198064   12.51798 
  PRIVCR 
Botswana   36.20655   25.87211   7.119924   12.51798 
Cameroon   28.49341   25.87211   9.160228   12.51798 
Côte d’Ivoire   45.66697   20.26184   13.69197   9.164546 
Ethiopia   18.39314   25.87211   7.325575   12.51798 
Gabon   35.26050   25.87211   5.990523   12.51798 
Ghana   31.68868   25.87211   9.974062   12.51798 
The Gambia   84.47623   18.39771   0.490475   3.841466 
Kenya   71.96736   20.26184   5.544523   9.164546 
Madagascar   34.68207   25.87211   5.030427   12.51798 
Malawi   42.76803   25.87211   8.703441   12.51798 
Mauritius   33.00089   18.39771   2.393089   3.841466 
Niger    43.14691   25.87211   9.469380   12.51798 
Nigeria   42.41382   25.87211   11.31797   12.51798 
Senegal   30.58270   20.26184   8.380337   9.164546 
Swaziland   27.00438   18.39771   2.110347   3.841466 
Togo   28.32960   25.87211   6.724192   12.51798 
South Africa  19.94146   18.39771   1.309335   3.841466 
Zimbabwe   37.05157   25.87211   12.48753   12.51798 
Notes: The critical values differ according to the number of observations and lags included. Eigen value test 
results (not reported but may be obtained from the author) are in general consistent with those associated 
with the trace test. In those cases where the results are not consistent we relied on the results of the trace 
statistic because the latter tends to have a superior power in small samples (see Lüutkepohl et al., 2001). 
The critical values in cointegration tests are based on the response surface coefficients of MacKinnon-
Haug-Michelis (1999).Table 3.  Zivot-Andrews Unit Root Test  
t-value (break year) 
  Income  LIQ  PRIVCR 
Country  Intercept  Trend  Both  Intercept  Trend  Both  Intercept  Trend  Both 






































































































































































































































































































































Critical values for Zivot and Andrews (1992) tests are as follows.  
Intercept: -4.80 (5%), -5.43 (1%); trend: -4.42 (5%), -4.93 (1%); both: -5.08% (5%), -5.57% (1%). 





Table 4. Tests for Cointegration with Structural Breaks (Gregory-Hansen test) 
  Income and LIQ  Income and PRIVCR 










Reject Ho of no 
Cointegration? 
Botswana  1977  -1.82  NO  1976  -1.01  NO 
Cameroon  1984  -3.33  NO  1984  -3.39  NO 
Côte d’Ivoire  1981  -1.24  NO  1981  -3.16  NO 
Gabon  1978  -2.95  NO  1978  -2.98  NO 
Ghana  1978  -1.83  NO  1978  -1.92  NO 
The Gambia  1979  -3.89  NO  1979  -3.48  NO 
Kenya  1978  -3.86  NO  1978  -3.82  NO 
Madagascar  1977  -1.15  NO  1979  -4.29  NO 
Malawi   1978  -3.21  NO  1978  -3.06  NO 
Mauritius  1988  -4.01  NO  1988  -3.54  NO 
Nigeria  1987  -3.01  NO  1987  -3.19  NO 
South Africa  1986  -3.06  NO  1986  -3.46  NO 







Table 5. Granger Causality/Block Exogeneity Wald Tests 
DM: Null hypothesis dependent variable is weakly exogenous (Wald statistic, [p value]*) 
  fd = LIQ  fd = PRIVC 
Dependent 
variable 
Lags  Y 
 





Botswana  2  8.88 [0.01]  0.28 [0.86]  3  15.23 [0.00]  3.00 [0.39] 
Cameroon  1  0.41 [0.52]  0.63 [0.42]   1  0.57 [0.44]   0.15 [0.69] 
Côte d’Ivoire  2  6.19 [0.04]  2.01 [0.36]  1  9.95 [0.00]  33.02 [0.00] 
Ethiopia  2  5.15 [0.07]  3.69 [0.15]  3  16.59[0.00]  12.70[0.00]  
Gabon  2  2.09 [0.35]  9.83 [0.00]    2  0.80 [0.67]   5.91 [0.051]   
Ghana  1  0.03 [0.86]  0.06 [0.81]  2  2.88 [0.23]    3.78 [0.15] 
The Gambia  2  5.48 [0.06]  7.83 [0.02]   1  0.88 [0.34]   0.02 [0.00]   
Kenya  5  3.10 [0.68]  9.68 [0.08]    1  0.58 [0.44]    13.11 [0.04]   
Madagascar  3  4.98 [0.17]  2.27 [0.51]  2  3.16 [0.20]   17.76 [0.00]   
Malawi  1  0.02 [0.86]  0.31 [0.57]   2  3.02 [0.22]    2.81 [0.24]  
Mauritius  1  0.84 [0.35]  7.21 [0.00]   6  51.02 [0.00]    10.05 [0.12] 
Niger   6  14.08 [0.02]  5.64 [0.46]  1  0.02 [0.89]    4.402 [0.03]   
Nigeria  1  3.20 [0.07]  6.16 [0.013]  1  5.13 [0.02]  8.43 [0.00] 
Senegal  2  5.78 [0.06]  7.47 [0.02]  2  2.95 [0.22]  10.89 [0.00] 
Swaziland  6  2.42 [0.87]  42.56 [0.00]   2  2.72 [0.25]   1.51 [0.46]  
Togo  1  0.23 [0.62]  9.05 [0.00]  1  0.04 [0.83]  9.46 [0.00] 
South Africa  6  27.32 [0.00]  25.77 [0.00]   2  12.97 [0.00]   10.50 [0.00]  
Zimbabwe  6  22.43 [0.00]  77.18 [0.00]   6  29.77 [0.00]  146.1 [0.00]  
 
The lag structure was determined two criteria: the Final Prediction Error (FPE) and Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC). 
 
























index in 1997 
Botswana  92  51  65  71  71  46  66 
Cameroon  59  45  39  86  57  46  55 
Côte d’Ivoire  71  54  68  43  43  85  61 
Ethiopia  41  18  7  29  14  23  22 
Gabon  77  5  64  86  100  77  68 
Ghana  79  75  45  71  86  85  73 
The Gambia  62  20  69  43  71  85  58 
Kenya  56  55  77  71  71  100  72 
Madagascar  68  52  61  71  57  69  63 
Malawi  62  56  43  43  43  46  45 
Mauritius  76  69  86  71  100  100  84 
Niger   73  35  67  43  57  85  60 
Nigeria  82  54  40  57  86  54  62 
Senegal  62  42  70  43  71  62  58 
Swaziland  63  62  63  86  0  77  58 
Togo  70  32  68  29  14  77  48 
South Africa  93  100  93  100  100  62  91 
Zimbabwe  73  45  57  86  57  62  63 
Average   69.94  48.33  60.11  62.72  61.00  68.94  61.84 
   Indices are on a 0-100 scale.  The averages have been recomputed based on the countries included in the present study. 
 
  Source: Gelbard. and Leite (1999).  Table 7. Institutional environment and the effects of financial development (PRIVCR) on income 
 
Country  Institutional 
environment 
(1997) 






South Africa  100  YES (bi-directional)  Negative  Negative 
Gabon  100  NO  --  -- 
Mauritius  100  YES  Negative  Positive 
Nigeria  86  YES (bi-directional)  Negative  Negative 
Ghana  86  NO  --  -- 
Botswana  71  YES  Positive  Negative 
The Gambia  71  NO  --  -- 
Kenya  71  NO  --  -- 
Senegal  71  NO  --  -- 
Cameroon  57  NO  --  -- 
Madagascar  57  NO  --  -- 
Niger  57  NO  --  -- 
Zimbabwe  57  YES (bi-directional)  Positive  Negative 
(and mixed) 
Côte d’Ivoire  43  YES (bi-directional)  Negative  Negative 
Malawi  43  NO  --  -- 
Ethiopia  14  YES (bi-directional)  Negative  Negative 
(positive after 
6 years) 
Togo  14  NO  --  -- 
Swaziland  0  NO  --  -- 
Average   61       
 
The institutional environment index is a measure of the extent of supporting institutions. It 
includes indicators of private ownership of land, private ownership of buildings, easiness of 
debt recovery through the judicial system, adequacy of commercial legislation, the 
presence of laws governing the use of checks, easiness of transferring ownership of real 
estate or land, and adequacy of land and property registration (source: Gelbard and Leite, 
1999). 
 
Inferences on the short-run and the long-run effects are based on impulse response 
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Response of  BOTS_PRIVCR to BOTS_LINC
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Response of  ZIMBABWE_PRIVCR  to ZIMBABWE_LINCEndnotes: 
                                                  
1 See Levine (2005) for a summary of the theoretical and empirical literature on this topic 
and Ang (2008a) for an excellent survey of recent developments in the literature of growth 
and finance. Also, see Arestis and Demetriades (1997) for an interesting critical survey of the 
empirical evidence. 
 
2 Using cointegration technique and VEC models, and measures of financial depth (ratio of 
broad money to nominal GDP) and financial intermediaries effectiveness (the ratio of reserve 
money to total deposits and the ratio of reserve money to quasi money), Baliamoune-Lutz 
(2003) also finds support for the demand-following proposition in Morocco but finds no 
support for the supply-leading hypothesis. 
 
3 Ang and McKibbin (2007) combine four measures into a single index of financial 
development. However, because the indicators we u se (LIQ and PRIVCR) measure two 
different aspects of financial development and the results we obtain indicate the effects of the 
two are not always consistent, we opted for using them as separate measures. 
 
4 The econometric methodology is succinctly presented in the paper because it is well known. 
 
5  The link between inequality and financial development could also be through the impact 
that inequality could have on the level of generalized trust in a society and the effect that 
trust could have on financial development (see Calderón et al. (2002), and Baliamoune-Lutz, 
2005 and 2009). 